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Amid discussion of how global health governance should and could be 
strengthened, the potential role of civil society organizations has been 
frequently raised.  This paper considers the role of Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs) in four health governance instruments under the auspices of the World 
Health Organization – the International Code on the Marketing of Breastmilk 
Substitutes, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, International Health 
Regulations and Codex Alimentarius - and maps the functions they have 
contributed to.  The paper draws conclusions about the opportunities and 
limitations CSOs represent for strengthening global health governance (GHG). 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A wide range of studies of global health governance (GHG) have drawn attention 
to significant shortfalls in existing institutional arrangements to deal with the 
challenges posed by a rapidly changing world.  Problems such as gaps or overlaps 
in mandates and activities, 1  undemocratic representation, insufficient 
transparency and accountability, 2  irrational distribution of resources, 3 and 
ultimately a lack of effectiveness in meeting global health needs, are longstanding 
concerns. 4   The emerging assemblage of institutions, rules and resources 
concerned with global health has evolved on a largely ad hoc basis, defined as 
much by political and economic power, as by health needs and priorities.  Overall, 
there is a sense that GHG is characterised by a considerable degree of 
dysfunction.5 
 Within this context, discussion over the past decade of how GHG should, 
and could, be strengthened has included consideration of the potential role of 
civil society organizations (CSOs).  While CSOs have been defined in a myriad of 
ways, within the context of this paper, CSOs are defined as distinct from 
organizations and institutions of the state and the market.  According to the 
World Health Organization (WHO), CSOs inhabit “the social arena between the 
state and citizen, and is not part of the state or market (for profit sector).”6  
Similarly, the World Bank defines CSOs as 
 
the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that 
have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their 
members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious 
or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous 
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groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional 
associations, and foundations.7 
 
 Within health development, CSOs have historically focused on health 
service delivery, notably in low and middle-income countries.  Since the 1980s, 
health-related CSOs have proliferated in type, number and functions they 
perform, a development largely seen in positive terms.8  Where governments 
have not delivered basic health services, for example, CSOs have stepped in as 
contracted by the state or donors, or have sought to fill gaps through charitable 
work.  Where specific population groups have been neglected by the state and/or 
market, CSOs have campaigned to influence policy priority setting on their 
behalves.  Where there has been a lack of public or private funding for health 
needs, CSOs have raised public awareness and mobilized resources.  Where 
corporate conduct has adversely affected population health, CSOs have advocated 
for appropriate regulation.  In short, there has been an increase in CSO activity in 
recent decades, including a diversification in the functions they perform. 
 As CSOs have come to play a more prominent role, there has been more 
critical reflection on the governance of CSOs themselves, as well as their 
performance of specific health governance functions.  As state and market-based 
actors have come under greater scrutiny, so too has there been a desire to assess 
CSOs against principles of “good governance.”9  What functions do CSOs play and 
are they appropriate?  How well are these functions fulfilled?  Are CSOs 
sufficiently accountable and transparent, and to whom?  To what extent is there 
sufficient evaluation of CSO activities?  As described in the Human Development 
Report 2002: 
 
[W]hen such groups spring from agendas or use tactics that are contrary to 
democratic values, they can be both civil and “uncivil”.  The rise of such 
groups poses challenges for truly democratic political engagement….many 
civil society groups recognize that they must be publicly accountable for 
their actions.10 
There is a particular need for systematic analysis of the functions CSOs perform 
in global health governance.  While built on health governance at the 
subnational, national and regional levels, GHG is distinguished from 
international health governance by 
health needs and interests that increasingly cut across and, in some cases, 
are oblivious to state boundaries. To effectively address these global health 
challenges, there is a need to strengthen, supplement and even replace 
existing forms of IHG. ... [S]tate and nonstate actors have long interacted 
on health governance. The difference for GHG will lie in their degree of 
involvement and nature of their respective roles, varying with the health 
issue concerned.11 
 
The emergent relationship between state and non-state actors (including CSOs) is 
particularly significant in GHG. 
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 This paper examines the interaction of CSOs with intergovernmental 
health organizations (IGOs), defined as organizations ostensibly concerned with 
health in which states comprise their core membership.  It briefly reviews four 
health governance instruments–the International Code on the Marketing of 
Breastmilk Substitutes, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 
International Health Regulations and Codex Alimentarius–under the auspices of 
the WHO, the United Nations (UN) specialised agency for health with 193 
member states.  The fourth is also a joint instrument under the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), another UN specialised agency with 191 member 
states.  Following a brief overview of the engagement of CSOs by WHO, this paper 
draws on a framework by Haas (2003) to map their contribution to specific 
governance functions in relation to these four instruments.  The paper discusses 
how effective CSO involvement has been, and draws conclusions about the 
opportunities and limitations CSOs represent for strengthening GHG. 
 
INCREASING ENGAGEMENT WITH CSOS IN HEALTH GOVERNANCE  
 
Given the growing complexity of these health and security challenges and 
the response required, these issues concern not only governments, but 
also international organizations, civil society and the business 
community. Recognizing this, the World Health Organization is making 
the world more secure by working in close collaboration with all 
concerned.–Margaret Chan, Director General, WHO, World Health Day, 
2007 
 
 Since the early 1990s, there has been widespread support within IGOs for 
enhancing the role of CSOs in health development including governance.  The 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, for example, argues that civil 
society “can play a crucial role in preventing violent conflict and in building 
peace.”12  UNAIDS describes CSOs as being “at the forefront of prevention, care 
and support programmes, particularly among the most vulnerable and hard-to-
reach populations.”13  The World Bank’s consultations with civil society are seen 
to have “improved the quality of policymaking, positively influenced the direction 
of country programmes, strengthened national ownership of key reforms, and 
promoted public sector transparency and accountability.”14 
 In WHO, a Civil Society Initiative (CSI) was launched in 2001 “to 
undertake a review of both official and informal relations between WHO and Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs); to develop a renewed policy for more effective 
collaboration, information exchange and dialogue with CSOs and improve the 
support offered by WHO to Member States in their work with NGOs and CSOs.”15 
Critics long pointed to the organization’s traditional emphasis on ministries of 
health, while formal relations with non-state (civil society and market-based) 
institutions remained limited.  The increased prominence of public-private 
partnerships in WHO from the late 1990s raised concerns about undue influence 
by corporate interests.16  Following a meeting with representatives of the People’s 
Health Assembly (PHA), Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland initiated 
efforts to improve engagement with CSOs.  An internal review found 482 
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“relationships” between CSOs and WHO headquarters, of which 56 percent were 
“official relations.” 17   The review was intended to pave the way for greater 
involvement in WHO activities through, for example, reforming the process of 
granting official relations status and enhancing informal participation.  The 
rationale for this change was described as follows: 
 
The engagement with civil society profoundly affects the ways in which 
international organizations understand and respond to the needs of people 
all over the world.  Concepts about poverty, equity, justice, security, rights 
and responsibilities take on new meaning.  Exposure to the complexities of 
cultures and communities hone critical thinking and sensitivity.  
Assumptions are challenged, power is redefined, change is initiated.18 
 
 Brundtland’s departure in 2003, however, saw the CSI largely shelved 
under her successor Lee Jong-wook.  Many CSOs continued to lament the 
difficulties of working with WHO, the closed nature of its activities, and allegedly 
blind romance with public-private partnerships.19  One important exception was 
the Commission on the Social Determinants of Health (CSDH), which adopted a 
strategy for meaningful CSO engagement in 2005: 
 
CSDH has adopted an innovative approach, departing from standard 
practice in international organizations and previous global commissions, 
where civil society "participation" has often meant rubber-stamping 
decisions made by others. 
 
The CSDH has asked civil society organizations to take an active role and 
share decision-making power in the Commission process. The specificity 
of the CSDH model of collaboration with civil society is that civil society 
actors themselves are defining how they want to work with the 
Commission, elaborating their strategies through national and regional 
consultative processes. In this way, the knowledge and concerns of civil 
society inform the agenda for collaborative action from the start.20 
 
Upon her election in 2006, Director-General Margaret Chan sought to build on 
this renewed effort by making “partnerships” one of six priorities, to be pursued 
through “strengthening relationships with civil society and the private sector, and 
creating greater alignment between partnerships.”21  To date, however, ongoing 
tensions between WHO and CSOs over access to medicines 22  and the 
organization’s publications policy23 have created some degree of uncertainty over 
relations. 
 
FUNCTIONS OF GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
 To address the limited theorising to date on the role of CSOs in GHG, this 
paper draws on the work of Peter Haas.  In assessing global environmental 
governance, he describes “two new geopolitical realities that challenge the old 
geographical principles of national sovereignty.”24  The first is the complexity of a 
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globalising world “whose management requires more holistic or comprehensive 
policies”.  The second is “the proliferation of new political actors and the diffusion 
of political authority over major governance functions.” 25  These new actors 
include CSOs, transnational corporations, organized transnational scientific 
networks (epistemic communities), global policy networks and selected 
intergovernmental organizations capable of exercising discretionary behaviour 
independently of their dominant member states (e.g. World Bank, European 
Commission).  Haas maps the division of labour among these diverse actors, 
evaluating how they perform and identifying comparative advantages, according 
to twelve governance functions (see Table 1).  Some functions are performed 
formally, that is, “by the direct commitment by somebody to a clear actor to 
perform the designated function or functions.”  Others are carried out informally, 
in that, “the functions may be observed but are not the consequence of intended 
action by those contracting some set of activities to be performed by the relevant 
actors.”26  
 
Table 1. Matrix of Functions 
 
Function Formal/direct Informal/indirect 
Issue linkage • By inter-governmental negotiations 
• By new information provided by 
epistemic communities 
• Through financial mechanisms (GEF) 
• By IOs (GEO/WEO) 
• By scientists 
• By business/industry 
Agenda setting • By IOs and member states 
• By scientists 
• By NGOs 
• By media 
• By scientists 
Developing usable 
knowledge 
• By scientists • By scientists 
• By NGOs 
• By business/industry 
Monitoring • By IOs 
• By committees nominated by MEA 
secretariat 
• By MEA signatory governments 
• By NGOs (particularly 
in developing countries) 
• By Scientists 
Rule making • Negotiations by national governments 
• By NGOs (principled standards) 
• By Business/Industry 
(de facto standards) 
• By NGOs (principled 
standards) 
Norm development • Epistemic communities • By NGOs (equity & 
environmental 
preservation) 
• By Business/Industry 
(efficiency) 
Policy Verification • Governments • NGOs 
• IOs 
Enforcement • (Hard) Law 
• WTO and MEA rules 
• NGO campaigns 
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Capacity building 
(tech transfer) 
• Official technical assistance (national 
and local government) 
• Business/Industry 
• Science community 
(education/training) 
• Business/Industry (joint 
venture) 
Capacity building 
(organizational 
skills) 
• By IOs 
• By NGOs 
• Science community 
(education/training) 
• By Business/Industry 
Promote vertical 
linkage 
• IOs 
• National and Local Governments 
• NGOs 
• Scientific community 
Financing • Government (ODA) 
• Regional Development Banks 
• Multilateral bodies 
• By Business/Industry 
 
Source:  Peter M. Haas, Is there a Global Governance Deficit and What Should be Done About It? 
(Geneva: Ecologic, 2003). 
 
 This paper uses this framework heuristically to map the roles of different 
institutional actors by function in relation to four key instruments of health 
governance.  The four instruments were selected as case studies because, while 
formally adopted by WHO member states, they illustrate different contributions 
by CSOs.  Drawing primarily on secondary sources, the case studies map the 
functions CSOs, alongside state and market-based actors, have contributed.  This 
mapping enables the beginning of a comparative analysis of the relative roles of 
different types of actors, whether this has differed across the four case studies, 
and how this might relate to the effectiveness of the four health governance 
instruments.  Recommendations on further analysis and, in particular, the need 
for primary data on CSO involvement in GHG, are provided in the discussion 
below. 
 
INTERNATIONAL CODE ON THE MARKETING OF BREASTMILK SUBSTITUTES  
 
Adopted in May 1981 by WHO member states, and prompted by concerns about 
the general decline in breastfeeding in many parts of the world, the International 
Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes27 represented the culmination of a 
prominent campaign by WHO, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and 
CSOs led by the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN).28  CSOs were 
particularly prominent in prompting global action, including the mounting of a 
boycott of the food manufacturer, Nestlé, for its marketing practices.  The 
campaign was highly successful at drawing worldwide public attention to the 
health consequences arising from such practices, and for creating a code of 
practice against which the actions of food manufacturers could be assessed. 
 For the purposes of this analysis, a mapping of governance functions 
concerning the Code (see Table 2) confirms that CSOs were critical actors for 
some functions.  The Code was formally adopted by WHO and UNICEF, with the 
authority of their member states, after a process of consultation with 
governments, the infant food industry, professional associations and CSOs.  
CSOs, such as War on Want and Save the Children, were particularly 
LEE, CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE FUNCTIONS OF GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, VOLUME III, NO. 2 (SPRING 2010)  http://www.ghgj.org              
 
7 
instrumental at drawing widespread public attention to the problem, organising 
the Nestlé boycott, and campaigning for governments to adopt an internationally 
recognised code of practice.  This put the issue on the agenda and chivvied states 
to act collectively.  Following adoption of the Code, CSO campaigning supported 
the adoption of follow-up resolutions in the WHA that reinforced or extended 
specific provisions.  Such efforts were also central to incorporating the Code into 
provisions under FAO, Codex Alimentarius, World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and other relevant international forums in the form of nutritional guidelines and 
trading principles. 
 However, the Code’s status, as an international code of practice, fell short 
of CSO hopes for a binding instrument that compelled action by states to adopt 
legislation with punitive measures for non-compliance.  As set out in Article 11, 
responsibility for implementation and monitoring of the Code is given to member 
states which “should take action to give effect to the principles and aim of the 
Code, as appropriate to their social and legislative framework, including the 
adoption of national legislation, regulations or other suitable measures.”  By 
1997, only 17 countries had adopted the Code's provisions in whole or in part as 
legal requirements, with most member states adopting no provisions.  
Monitoring of compliance to the Code was also made a relatively weak function, 
left largely to CSOs to undertake: 
 
Nongovernmental organizations, professional groups, institutions, and 
individuals concerned should have the responsibility of drawing the 
attention of manufacturers or distributors to activities which are 
incompatible with the principles and aim of this Code, so that appropriate 
action can be taken.  The appropriate governmental authority should be 
notified.29 
 
While violations of the Code have been regularly reported by CSOs,30 including 
the claim that 4000 babies continue to die each day from unsafe bottle feeding,31 
the lack of designated resources for this function or, perhaps most importantly, 
resort to a punitive mechanism for non-compliance has left the monitoring 
function effectively “toothless.” 
 
Table 2. Functions in the Global Governance of Breastmilk Substitutes 
 
Function Formal/Direct Informal/Indirect 
Issue linkage • By CSOs (drawing attention to 
link between health problems 
and marketing practices) 
• By health workers 
(reporting of infant and 
child health problems) 
Agenda setting • By CSOs and health 
professionals (campaigning for 
regulation) 
 
Developing usable 
knowledge 
• By IGOs (WHO development of 
evidence base) 
• By CSOs (contribution of 
evidence from different 
countries) 
• By scientists (research on 
infant feeding practices 
and health) 
Monitoring • By CSOs (i.e. Breaking the Rules,  
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Stretching the Rules and Look 
What They’re Doing reports) 
• By business/industry (i.e. 
monitoring own marketing 
practices) 
Rule making • By IGOs (WHO and UNICEF 
adoption of Code) 
• By other IGOs (FAO, WTO and 
Codex Alimentarius) 
• By national governments 
(adoption of code into domestic 
law) 
• By business/industry 
(bringing legal action 
challenging 
interpretation of Code’s 
requirements) 
Norm development • By IGOs (WHO adoption of 
follow up resolutions) 
• By business/industry 
(CSR initiatives and legal 
action challenging 
reported violations) 
• By CSOs (drawing public 
attention to Code and 
violations, promoting 
breastfeeding) 
Policy verification • By national governments 
(reporting progress to WHO) 
• By CSOs (periodic reports on 
state of the code by country and 
company) 
• By health workers (e.g. reporting 
violations to government 
officials) 
 
Enforcement • By national governments (e.g. 
adoption and enforcement of 
penalties under domestic law) 
• By CSOs through public 
approbation (e.g. 
consumer boycott) 
• By health workers and 
individuals (e.g. 
complaints to 
manufacturers) 
Capacity building 
(technology transfer) 
• By national governments (i.e. 
providing information on infant 
feeding) 
• By CSOs (International Code 
Documentation Centre) 
• By business/industry (only if 
strictly approved by government)  
 
Capacity building 
(organizational 
skills) 
• By CSOs  
Promote vertical 
integration 
• By IGOs and national 
governments (i.e. promoting 
code within broader maternal 
and child health strategy) 
 
Financing • By national governments (i.e. 
allocation of resources for 
implementing Code) 
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 Overall, this case study suggests the increased importance of CSOs to the 
functions of issue linkage, agenda setting and developing usable knowledge.  The 
Code’s limited authority over member states, dependence on CSOs to monitor 
compliance, and reliance on moral suasion rather than sanctions reduced the 
Code to an effectively voluntary standard.  This suggests that, where health-
harming behaviours require regulation, particularly when they involve powerful 
and well-resourced economic interests, CSOs are necessary but not sufficient to 
the effective functioning of GHG. 
 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL  
 
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) was adopted in 2003 
and entered into force in February 2005.  As of January 2010, 168 countries have 
signed and ratified the agreement.  While negotiation of the FCTC was ostensibly 
an intergovernmental process, CSOs played a key role in fulfilling certain 
functions. 
 A mapping of the governance functions for global tobacco control (see 
Table 3) suggests the FCTC process was strongly influenced by CSOs.  WHA 
resolution 52.18 (May 1999) established two bodies to draft the convention: a 
Technical Working Group to prepare the proposed draft elements; and 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) to draft and negotiate the agreement 
and possible related protocols.  Participation in both bodies was open to all 
member states, regional integration organizations, and observers including CSOs.  
WHA Resolution 53.16 (May 2000) called upon the INB “to examine the question 
of extended participation by nongovernmental organizations as observers” in the 
negotiations.  A report on NGO participation was presented to the Executive 
Board in January 2001 and two organizations, the International 
Nongovernmental Coalition Against Tobacco and Infant Feeding Action Coalition 
(INFACT), were admitted into official relations for this purpose.  Accreditation of 
additional CSOs, usually a time-consuming process, was fast-tracked by WHO 
which recognised the importance of their presence at negotiations.32  In addition, 
prior to the INB’s first of six sessions, public hearings were convened by the 
Director-General in 2000 “to provide a forum for the public health community, 
the tobacco industry and farmers’ groups to submit their case.”33  Finally, the 
WHO Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) held regional pre-negotiation consultative 
meetings where CSOs were invited to attend as observers. 
 
Table 3. Functions in the Global Governance of Tobacco Control 
 
Function Formal/Direct Informal/Indirect 
Issue linkage • By IGOs (WHO Tobacco Free 
Initiative) 
• By scientists (smoking 
and health research) 
Agenda setting • By IGOs (FCTC Working Group 
and ING) 
• By national governments 
• By CSOs as observers in 
FCTC Working Group 
and ING) 
• By business/industry 
lobbying policy makers 
Developing usable • By IGOs (WHO TFI surveillance • By scientists (smoking 
LEE, CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE FUNCTIONS OF GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, VOLUME III, NO. 2 (SPRING 2010)  http://www.ghgj.org              
 
10 
knowledge surveys; World Bank, FAO) 
• National governments (CDC 
youth survey) 
and health research) 
• By business/industry 
(industry funded 
research) 
• By legal action (discovery 
of internal industry 
documents) 
Monitoring • By IGO (national reports to 
WHO FCTC Interim Secretariat) 
• By CSOs (FCA reporting 
lack of compliance by 
governments and 
violations by industry) 
Rule making • By IGOs (WHO member states 
adopting FCTC and protocols) 
• By national governments 
(adoption of national legislation) 
• By CSOs (as observers at 
ING sessions) 
• By legal systems 
(litigation against 
tobacco industry) 
Norm development • By IGOs (WHO TFI awareness 
building among member states) 
• By national governments 
(support of tobacco control 
programmes) 
• By health workers (public 
education) 
• By CSOs 
• By business/industry 
(e.g. CSR initiatives) 
Policy verification • By IGO (WHO FCTC Secretariat 
national reporting; Global 
Information System on Tobacco 
Control; Global Youth Tobacco 
Survey) 
• By CSOs (scrutiny of 
industry CSR initiatives 
against practices; public 
health and scientific 
conferences) 
Enforcement • By IGO (WHO FCTC Secretariat) • By CSOs (campaigning 
and exertion of public 
pressure) 
Capacity building 
(technology transfer) 
• By WHO FCTC Secretariat 
(technical assistance to member 
states) 
• By CSOs (RITC; Fogarty 
International Centre; 
Rockefeller Foundation; 
Globalink) 
Capacity building 
(organizational 
skills) 
• By WHO FCTC Interim 
Secretariat (technical assistance 
to member states) 
• By CSOs (RITC; 
Bloomberg Global 
Tobacco Initiative) 
Promote vertical 
integration 
• By WTO TFI (development of 
comprehensive tobacco control 
strategies) 
• By national governments 
(through adoption and support 
of comprehensive tobacco 
control policies) 
 
Financing • By CSOs (e.g. Bloomberg Global 
Tobacco Initiative, Rockefeller 
Foundation Trading Tobacco 
Initiative) 
• By research funding 
bodies (e.g. Fogarty, 
NIH) 
 
 The capacity of CSOs to participate in the FCTC process was enhanced 
significantly by the formation of the Framework Convention Alliance (FCA) 
comprised of more than 250 organizations in over 90 countries.  Created to 
support the negotiation, ratification, and implementation of the FCTC, the FCA’s 
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mission was to achieve this through the promotion and support of a global 
network for campaigning against tobacco; development of tobacco control 
capacity, particularly in developing countries; and monitoring compliance with 
FCTC provisions. 
 The increased prominence of CSOs at the FCTC, facilitated through the 
FCA, was evident at the INBs.  Individual CSOs were permitted to submit 
statements at the end of each negotiating session which, while not equivalent to 
the rights of member states to participate in negotiations, was an advance on 
usual WHO procedure.  Allowing CSOs to table their views was deemed especially 
important by tobacco control advocates given efforts by some governments, 
notably the US, Germany and Japan, to weaken the strength of the treaty’s 
measures.  For example the Japanese government, which owns half of Japan 
Tobacco International, argued for the extensive use of optional language (e.g. 
“appropriate measures”) to weaken the authority of the FCTC.34  CSOs publicised 
the positions of intransigent governments, communicated worldwide through the 
internet as negotiations unfolded, enhancing the transparency of the process.  In 
addition, CSOs lobbied delegates and hosted informal briefings between 
negotiation sessions to delegates on key topics, such as cigarette smuggling, 
taxation and cross-border advertising. 
 Following the agreement of the FCTC in 2003, the FCA continued to play 
an active role in supporting the signing and ratification of the treaty by member 
states.  This was achieved, in part, through efforts to improve the evidence base 
for FCTC implementation.  Working alongside WHO and donors, organizations 
such as Tobacco Free Kids, Cancer Research UK and Bloomberg Family 
Foundation provided much needed support for research on tobacco supply and 
demand in low and middle-income countries.  Nevertheless, resource constraints 
have remained a major problem.  Funding for tobacco control in all countries 
remains disproportionately low, relative to the disease burden caused.  Increased 
recognition of the public health impact of non-communicable diseases has 
resulted in increased attention in recent years.  Funding for tobacco control 
research, especially in relation to LMICs, has remained scarce despite the 
predicted 7 million deaths from tobacco annually by 2030.35 
 Like the International Code on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, 
much has also hinged on the adoption and enforcement of FCTC provisions into 
national tobacco control policy by member states.  Evidence suggests that, in 
countries where industry interests have lobbied to prevent or weaken national 
policies, the active counter lobbying of CSOs has been critical to sustaining 
political support for tobacco control. 36   Once again, compliance has been 
hindered by the lack of punitive measures other than moral sanction. 
 
REVISED INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS OF 2005 
 
The origins of the IHR lie in the nineteenth century (then known as the 
International Sanitary Regulations) as measures to govern the sanitary 
conditions required by all forms of transport for preventing the international 
spread of disease.  The agreement of the IHR was ostensibly driven by the desire 
to facilitate growing trade relations.37  Limited to selected diseases and functions, 
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the IHR has been subject to periodic revision.  Economic globalization, with its 
intensified trade flows and incorporation of virtually all countries into the world 
trading system, led to a process of fundamental review of the IHR in the late 
1990s.  This proved an initially protracted process because of a lack of political 
will and resources.  The SARS outbreak and prospects of an influenza pandemic, 
however, lent renewed urgency to the process.  The revised IHR was unanimously 
adopted by the WHA on 23 May 2005, and entered into force in June 2007.38  
The broadened purpose and scope of the IHR (2005) are to “prevent, protect 
against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread 
of disease and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic 
and trade.”39 
 The provisions adopted under the IHR (2005) provide a good example of 
efforts to enhance GHG through, inter alia, broader engagement with non-state 
actors.  Perhaps the most significant achievement of the revised IHR (2005) is its 
capacity to draw on information sources beyond governments.  In the past, a key 
limitation of disease surveillance, monitoring and reporting was dependence on 
government data sources which, if not forthcoming or inaccurate, weakened the 
capacity for collective action.  The narrow scope of the IHR also meant that 
governments were only obligated to disclose information on yellow fever, cholera 
and plague.  The IHR (2005) states that, while national IHR Focal Points will 
liaise with WHO IHR Contact Points, WHO “may take into account reports from 
sources other than notifications or consultations and shall assess these reports 
according to established epidemiological principles and then communicate 
information on the event to the State Party in whose territory the event is 
allegedly occurring.”40 
 This enhanced institutional structure is what WHO calls a “network of 
networks” whereby surveillance is based on links among national health care 
systems, mass media, health organizations, laboratories and institutions focusing 
on particular disease conditions.  These networks are increasingly linked across 
countries, regions, and globally, through governments, centers of excellence (e.g. 
US Centers for Disease Control, Pasteur Institutes), WHO offices, military 
networks (e.g. US Department of Defence Global Emerging Infectious Disease 
System) and internet discussion sites such as Promed 
(http://www.promedmail.org) and Epi-X (http://www.cdc.gov/epix).  In 1997, 
WHO initiated the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) 
which was formally adopted by member states in 2000.  In 2009, the network 
boasted more than 150 partners around the world. 
 
Table 4. Functions in the Gobal Infectious Disease Surveillance 
Through the International Health Regulations 
 
Function Formal/Direct Informal/Indirect 
Issue linkage • By national governments 
(reporting of disease outbreaks) 
• By IGOs (WHO EPR outbreak 
reporting) 
• By health workers 
(reporting of disease 
outbreaks) 
• By business/industry 
(economic losses 
incurred as a result of 
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infectious disease threats 
or responses) 
Agenda setting • By national governments (need 
for improved surveillance 
systems) 
• By IGOs (WHO EPR) 
 
Developing usable 
knowledge 
• By national governments 
(national public health systems) 
• By IGOs (WHO EPR 
development of standards of 
reporting; coordination and 
dissemination of data) 
• By CSOs (ProMed, 
disease monitoring and 
reporting networks) 
Monitoring  • By CSOs (through 
ongoing reporting of 
outbreaks) 
Rule making • By IGOs (WHO member states 
revise IHR) 
• By national governments 
(adoption of national legislation 
and surveillance systems) 
• By research institutions 
Norm development • By IGOs (WHO standards 
setting, nomenclature) 
 
Policy verification • By national governments 
(ministries of health) 
• By IGOs (WHO EPR) 
• By CSOs (disease 
monitoring and reporting 
networks) 
• By mass media 
Enforcement • By IGOs (WHO EPR issuance of 
travel advisories and 
restrictions) 
 
Capacity building 
(technology transfer) 
• By IGOs (WHO Office for 
National Epidemic Preparedness 
and Response) 
• By national governments (aid to 
build surveillance capacity in 
LMICs) 
• By research institutions 
(training of health 
workers/epidemiologists
) 
Capacity building 
(organizational 
skills) 
• By national governments (aid to 
build surveillance capacity in 
LMICs) 
• By IGOs (WHO Office for 
National Epidemic Preparedness 
and Response) 
 
Promote vertical 
integration 
• By governments and IGOs 
(building of national, regional 
and global networks) 
 
Financing • By national governments (health 
sector aid) 
 
 
 Overall, government institutions remain central to the global governance 
of infectious disease surveillance, acting as the key institutional nodes within 
networks for surveillance, monitoring, reporting and response.  This is reflected 
in the requirement, under the IHR (2005) for States Parties to build capacity 
through the development, strengthening and maintaining of core surveillance 
and response capacities to detect, assess, notify and report public health events to 
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WHO and respond to public health risks and public health emergencies.  To date, 
CSOs have played a supplemental albeit critical role–filling information gaps or 
confirming reports–in a timely manner to enable government institutions to 
respond.  In this way, disease surveillance has become a more open process, 
allowing information to flow in a more open and transparent manner. 
 
CODEX ALIMENTARIUS    
 
The Codex Alimentarius - a collection of 250 or so standards, codes of practice, 
guidelines and other recommendations - was created in 1963 by the FAO and 
WHO to be “the single most important international reference point for 
developments associated with food standards.”41  The Codex is governed by the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), comprised of 172 member states, which 
meets in plenary every two years (alternately in Rome and Geneva).  Total 
participation numbers around 600 delegates.  National delegations are led by 
senior officials appointed by their governments.  Delegations may, and often do, 
include representatives of industry, consumers’ organizations and academic 
institutes.  Countries that are not yet members of the Commission sometimes 
attend in an observer capacity.  To facilitate continuous contact with member 
states, the CAC, in collaboration with national governments, has established 
country Codex Contact Points and many member states have National Codex 
Committees to coordinate activities nationally. 
 Officially recognised non-state actors may attend the CAC in an observer 
capacity.  Although “observers”, the tradition of the CAC allows such 
organizations to put forward their points of view at every stage except in the final 
decision, which is the exclusive prerogative of member states.  Criticism has been 
raised about the extent to which the food industry is represented within the CAC, 
and thus the balance achieved between the goals of for-profit trade and consumer 
protection.  According to the report, Cracking the Codex, 81 percent of non-
governmental participants on national delegations came from industry between 
1989 and 1991, while only one percent represented public interest groups.42  The 
study examined participation on all Codex committees, which met from 1989-
1991, and found that industry representatives accounted for 26 percent of 
participants.  Industry participation increased on committees dealing with 
particularly controversial issues.  For example, one-third of the 387 participants 
in the two meetings of the Committee on Pesticide Residues were industry 
representatives, and 86 of these participants represented specific agrochemical 
and food companies; only three participants at these meetings represented public 
interest groups.  Forty-one percent of the participants in the two meetings of the 
Codex Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants were food industry 
representatives.  On the Codex Committee for Nutrition and Special Dietary Uses, 
47 percent of participants represented industry. 
 This imbalance in the representation of market-based actors has led to 
criticisms that this results in food standards, which favour trade interests.  Many 
Codex standards, it is argued, remain lower than some national standards, 
allowing, for example, residues of hazardous pesticides banned or strictly limited 
in many countries.  Lang writes, “With an increased role for Codex, nations will 
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effectively hand a great deal of control over the regulation of food safety and 
quality to global trade and corporate interests.”43 
 
Table 5. Functions in the Global Governance of Food Standards 
Through the Codex Alimentarius 
 
Function Formal/Direct Informal/Indirect 
Issue linkage • By national governments 
• By business/industry 
• By business/industry 
• By CSOs (consumer 
groups drawing attention 
to food safety issues) 
• By health workers 
(reporting of foodborne 
diseases) 
Agenda setting • By national governments 
• By business/industry 
• By IGOs (WHO, FAO and WTO) 
• By CSOs (consumer 
groups) 
• By mass media 
(reporting on food 
related issues) 
Developing usable 
knowledge 
• By IGO (CAC expert committees) 
• By business/industry (support 
for industry funded research) 
• By research institutions 
(research on food safety 
and nutrition issues) 
Monitoring • By national governments (food 
standards authorities) 
• By CSOs (consumer 
groups) 
Rule making • By IGOs (Codex sub and 
coordinating committees draft 
regulations) 
• By national governments 
• By business/industry 
(representation on national 
delegations and consultation as 
“interested parties”) 
• By CSOs (consumer 
group proposals on food 
safety, labelling etc.) 
Norm development • By IGOs (WTO SPS and TBT on 
food harmonisation) 
• By business/industry 
(representation on technical and 
standard setting bodies) 
• By business/industry 
(marketing of food 
products) 
Policy verification • By national governments 
• By IGOs (WHO, FAO and WTO) 
• By CSOs (consumer 
groups) 
Enforcement • By national governments 
(customs checks; legal action 
against violations 
 
Capacity building 
(technology transfer) 
• By IGOs (WHO and FAO support 
to member states to build 
technical and administrative 
infrastructure to implement 
Codex) 
• By IGO (WTO Standards and 
Trade Development Facility) 
 
Capacity building 
(organizational 
skills) 
• By IGOs (as above)  
Promote vertical   
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integration 
Financing • By national governments 
(inspection and enforcement) 
• By business/industry 
(production costs to comply with 
regulations) 
• By IGO (WHO/FAO Trust Fund 
to participate in Codex) 
 
 
 In summary, this case study suggests that appropriate governance to 
protect and promote population health within an increasingly globalised food 
production system requires an improved system of representation and 
participation.  This is especially relevant given the enhanced role of Codex in 
trade liberalisation, and growing evidence of the links between weak global food 
regulation and nutrition-related health problems. 44  At present, CSOs 
representing consumer interests are not well represented, and occupy a largely 
informal role in governance functions. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: CSOS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF GLOBAL HEALTH 
GOVERNANCE  
 
A review of GHG, in relation to the social determinants of health, concludes that 
“[t]he past two to three decades has brought a period of transition from 
international to global governance including health governance.  Societies around 
the world are faced with the challenge of finding more effective means of 
collectively addressing issues of global relevance.”  The review found that, to date, 
this challenge has been far from met.  There is a need for the overall structure of 
global governance to be fundamentally reviewed, in the context of the needs, 
priorities and political culture of the early 21st century.  
 This brief review finds that CSOs have contributed to diverse functions 
across the four health governance instruments.  Traditionally, CSOs have played 
a supplementary role where government institutions have been weak or 
nonexistent, where there are gaps in funding and resources, or where neglected 
issues or constituencies require advocacy.  Perhaps most visibly, CSOs are 
accepted as playing a critical watchdog role, ensuring that formally mandated 
governmental institutions fulfil their responsibilities appropriately, and keeping a 
watchful eye on corporate actors exerting undue influence or engaging in health 
harming activities.  These functions have been essential to the International Code 
on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, where ongoing campaigning and 
advocacy by CSOs have been critical to achieving policy attention.  CSOs played 
an even more significant role in the negotiation and implementation of the FCTC, 
fulfilling an unusually wide range of functions traditionally dominated by 
governments.  However, CSOs have been less involved in formal proceedings of 
the CAC or revision process for the IHR (2005).  In the case of the latter, there is 
now formal recognition of the importance of CSOs to effective disease 
surveillance, playing a supplementary role when state institutions cannot or will 
not report to WHO promptly. 
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 What conclusions can we draw from these examples for the strengthening 
of GHG?  First, CSOs have played the biggest roles in initiating, formulating and 
implementing formal rules in GHG.  Given the intergovernmental nature of the 
instruments reviewed, CSOs perhaps understandably have not been given formal 
authority to make and enforce policy decisions.  Although the formal authority of 
CSOs participating in GHG remains limited, the FCTC and IHR (2005) suggest 
that informal participation can be highly effective.  Governments are likely to 
continue to fulfil the formal functions of rule making, but can enhance the policy 
process by broadening the scope for involvement by CSOs through improved 
consultation, granting of observer status, and provision of resources to 
participate in specific functions.  This is especially important where states may 
fail to uphold agreed rules or powerful vested interests seek to limit their 
effectiveness.  This fits with Haas’ argument that decentralised governance (or 
multi-level governance) should structure reform of global environmental 
institutions, with effective governance resting on the performance of multiple 
functions performed by a range of institutional actors including CSOs.  This 
model could be applied to further reflection on the reform of GHG. 
 Second, there are certain functions that require fulfilment by state 
institutions to ensure GHG instruments are effective.  The adoption of the 
International Code on Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes was a remarkable 
achievement, but the failure to follow this up with formal mechanisms for 
monitoring and enforcement by government institutions, with punitive measures 
embodied in national legislation, has limited its capacity to protect public health.  
Heavy reliance on CSOs to implement the Code, without commensurate 
resources or legislative authority, has been problematic.  This lesson should be 
applied in the process of FCTC implementation where WHO is supporting 
member states in the adoption of comprehensive tobacco control policies backed 
by legislative powers. 
 Third, despite a more institutionally crowded playing field, GHG remains 
far from pluralist in a true sense.  The case studies suggest that, like global 
governance as a whole, GHG is being characterised by greater, rather than lesser, 
concentration of power in fewer hands.  In some cases, increased CSO 
participation can enhance the diversity of interests represented.  In food 
standards setting, corporate actors remain far more prominent, prompting 
concerns about the representativeness of decision-making.  At the same time, 
CSOs can themselves be elitist, and their membership must also be critically 
assessed. 
 Finally, more detailed understanding of the respective roles of state, 
market and civil society actors is needed in terms of specific functions, and across 
different GHG institutions and instruments.  Beyond this initial mapping of 
functions based on secondary sources, systematic collection of primary data 
across a fuller range of intergovernmental institutions and instruments is needed 
such as the World Bank, UNAIDS and OECD.  Moreover, there is need to analyse 
the multitude of global health initiatives that have been formed since the 1990s, 
including the numerous global public-private partnerships.45  Such initiatives, by 
their very nature, are comprised of state, market and civil society actors.  
Understanding how meaningfully CSOs have been involved in such partnerships, 
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and GHG in general, would be an important step towards ensuring appropriate 
checks and balances in a system of GHG. 
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